Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence by Schoenhard, Paul M.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 17 Volume XVII 
Number 2 Volume XVII Book 2 Article 1 
2006 
Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to 
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence 
Paul M. Schoenhard 
Ropes & Gray LLP, schoenhard@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul M. Schoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to Guide Federal Circuit 
Patent Jurisprudence, 17 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 299 (2006). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol17/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to Guide Federal 
Circuit Patent Jurisprudence 
Cover Page Footnote 
Amy E.L. Schoenhard, Kevin J. Post, Jason W. Melvin, John A. Schoenhard, and Cassandra H. Welch for 
their invaluable comments; and to Tracy Hubbell for her research assistance. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol17/iss2/1 
SCHOENHARD_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC 1/23/2007 4:22 PM 
 
299 
Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real 
Property Principles to Guide Federal 
Circuit Patent Jurisprudence 
Paul M. Schoenhard∗ 
 “I am convinced that shuffling our current precedent 
merely continues a charade . . . .” 
 —Judge Haldane R. Mayer1 
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 1 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order for reh’g en 
banc) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a pervasive perception that the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit reverses district court rulings in patent cases at 
an inordinately high rate.  This view has led to a mounting battle 
cry for specialized patent judges in each of this nation’s ninety-
four federal district courts.  But the creation of a specialized patent 
judiciary at the district-court level is an inefficient solution to a 
non-existent problem.  By the numbers, existing district court 
judges are reversed no more frequently in patent cases generally 
than they are in other areas of their dockets.2  And there is no 
evidence that specialized judges would perform better.3  If one 
focuses, however, only on the rate at which district court decisions 
involving claim construction are reversed on appeal, the figure is 
higher than for patent cases generally.4  As a result, to increase 
certainty and predictability in patent cases, it is desirable to target 
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for claim construction 
determinations in particular. 
This Article offers an approach to lowering the patent claim 
construction reversal rate by reconsidering the role of intent and 
other underlying facts in patent claim construction through the lens 
of real property law.  Part I details (1) the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal rate of district court decisions both generally and in claim 
construction cases in particular; and (2) existing proposals to 
reduce that rate.  With reference to well-settled principles of real 
property law, I explain in Part II how inquiries into intent and other 
 
 2 See infra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra note 21. 
 4 See infra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
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underlying facts are already a critical part of patent claim 
construction and may be recognized as such without violating the 
public notice function of patent claims.  Finally, I conclude in 
Part III that explicit consideration of intent and other underlying 
facts during the process of patent claim construction would require 
the application of appropriate deferential standards on appeal, thus 
lowering the rate at which lower court determinations are reversed. 
I. POINTING FINGERS 
A. What Is the Reversal Rate? 
It is first necessary to sort between fact and fiction when it 
comes to the rate at which the Federal Circuit reverses district 
court decisions.  A variety of reversal rates have been published in 
academic journals and by the legal press, varying wildly from 22 
percent5 to approximately 50 percent6 of all patent cases being 
reversed.  These numbers have caught the eye of Congress, where 
a variety of patent reform bills have been considered recently.  
Among their proponents is Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Ca.), who has been 
quoted as stating: “The reversal rate is so high that it’s almost like 
a flip of a coin.”7  It is no small wonder that statements like these 
are cause for some concern.  But complaints of a high reversal rate 
do not accurately reflect our present reality. 
 
 5 Kimberly A. Moore, Judge, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 397, 399 (2000) (finding that 78% of trial court 
judgments appealed to the Federal Circuit between 1983 and 1999 had all issues 
affirmed). 
 6 See Stephen P. Swinton & Adam A. Welland, Patent Injunction Reform and the 
Overlooked Problem of ‘False Positives’, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 337, n.4 
(“Oft-cited published empirical studies suggest a reversal rate between 34 and 47.3 
percent.”) (citing Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1098 (2001)); see also Swinton & 
Welland, supra, at 337 (“Depending on the analysis employed and period examined, 
reversal rates for trial court judgments in patent infringement cases range from 30 to 
more than 60 percent.”). 
 7 Erik Larson, Bill Would Create Patent “Rocket Dockets” Within Courts, IP LAW360, 
Feb. 7, 2006, http://ip.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=5245.  Rep. Issa is the 
sponsor of H.R. 5418.  See infra note 20. 
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Considering all district court appeals to the Federal Circuit,8 
Figure 1 depicts a precipitous drop in the Federal Circuit’s reversal 
rate over the past eight years—stabilizing at 13% in 2004 and 
2005.  Contrary to common belief, reversal rates above 20% have 
not been seen since 2002.9  Indeed, over the past few years, the 
Court’s reversal rate has fallen in line with other courts of appeal, 
which reverse on average 12–13% of appealed district court 
decisions in private civil cases.  District court judges are thus 
reversed no more frequently in patent cases than elsewhere in their 
dockets.  It follows that there is not a systemic failure at the district 
court level in patent cases. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Terminated District Court Appeals Reversed10 
 
 8 Given the Federal Circuit’s limited jurisdiction over district court appeals, see 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1338, 1346 (2000) (granting the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over 
appeals from the district courts in patent cases and other limited issues, for example, 
Plant Variety Protection Act cases), and the small percentage of the Federal Circuit’s 
docket that may be attributed to non-patent district court appeals, it is a safe assumption 
that the figures cited here are representative of the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate of 
district court appeals in patent cases. 
 9 Note that Prof. Moore’s detailed study on this topic, Moore, Judge, Juries and Patent 
Cases, supra note 5, was published in 2000 and was based on statistics for years before 
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate decreased to its current level. 
 10 The data for this Figure were extracted from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts’ annual reports for the fiscal years ending on September 30 of the years indicated.  
For 1997 data, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS—1997, at tbl.B-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judicial_business/b05sep97.pdf; tbl.B-8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judicial_business/b08sep97.pdf.  For 1998 data, see Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—1998, at tbl.B-5, available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/b05sep98.pdf; tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/b08sep98.pdf.  For 1999 data, see Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—1999, at 
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Within the narrow area of patent claim construction, however, 
district court decisions are reversed with greater frequency.  
Specifically, although there is little agreement on the precise rate 
of reversal in claim construction cases—reported statistics vary 
from 34.5%11 to 40%,12 and are even as high as 71%13—there is 
 
tbl.B-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/b05sep99.pdf; tbl.B-8, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/b08sep99.pdf.  For 2000 data, see 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS—2000, at tbl.B-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/ 
b05sep00.pdf; tbl.B-8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/ 
b08sep00.pdf.  For 2001 data, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—2001, at tbl.B-5, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/b05mar01.pdf; tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/b08mar01.pdf.  For 2002 data, see 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS—2002, at tbl.B-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/ 
b05sep02.pdf; tbl.B-8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/ 
b08sep02.pdf.  For 2003 data, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—2003, at 94–97 tbl.B-5, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/b5.pdf; 111 tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/b8.pdf.  For 2004 data, see 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS—2004, at 100–03 tbl.B-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/ 
appendices/b5.pdf; 117 tbl.B-8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/ 
appendices/b8.pdf.  For 2005 data, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—2005, at 126–29 tbl.B-5, available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b5.pdf; 143 tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b8.pdf. 
 11 Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) [hereinafter Moore, Markman 
Eight Years Later] (“The reversal rate (rate at which the Federal Circuit determined the 
claim construction was wrong) for appealed claim terms from 1996, after Markman was 
decided, through 2003 is 34.5%.”); see also Erik Larson, Special IP Trial Courts A Bad 
Idea, Lawyers Say, IP LAW360, Feb. 1, 2006, http://ip.law360.com/Secure/ 
ViewArticle.aspx?id=5183 (“Although the reversal rate appears to be dropping slowly, it 
is still around 35%.”). 
 12 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., 
dissenting) (citing a statistic of 40% for claim construction reversals); see also Steve 
Seidenberg, Federal Circuit Clears Up Patent-Interpretation Rules, INSIDECOUNSEL, Oct. 
2005, at 28 (quoting a figure of 35–40% for claim construction reversals), available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_167/ip/43-1.html. 
 13 Symposium, A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction From The Perspective of The 
District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 680–82 (2004) (“Recently, Matt Powers, an 
attorney in California, conducted a few studies and came up with some staggering 
numbers.  His numbers show that reversal of claim construction decisions in the last six 
SCHOENHARD_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC 1/23/2007  4:22 PM 
304 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:299 
general agreement that the Federal Circuit is more likely to reverse 
decisions involving claim construction than otherwise.  And it is 
most commonly in the narrow context of patent claim construction 
that people have attributed the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate to 
failure at the trial court level.14 
B. The Conventional Wisdom15 
Trial courts are a convenient target.  When a trial court is 
reversed, that means it got it wrong.  Right?  Not necessarily.  But 
for now, let’s assume the trial court got it wrong. 
The convenient solution is to replace the existing trial courts.  
Everywhere we turn, we see specialized patent courts.16  For 
 
months is running about seventy-one percent.  Over the last year, the reversal rate has 
been fifty-eight percent.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 12, at 28, available at http://www.inside 
counsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_167/ip/43-1.html (“Unfortunately, when it comes to 
construing patents, the courts’ track record is poor.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District 
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27–28 
(2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges] (“The high reversal rate on claim 
construction is problematic.  It creates uncertainty in patent cases and in patent claim 
scope analysis until the Federal Circuit review is complete. . . .  The unintended 
consequence of having district court judges construe patent claim terms as a question of 
law is that, rather than promoting settlement, it increases uncertainty and prolongs 
litigation because parties hold out for Federal Circuit review.”). 
 15 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 89–90 (2005): 
It was John Kenneth Galbraith, the hyperliterate economic sage, who coined 
the phrase “conventional wisdom.”  He did not consider it a compliment.  “We 
associate truth with convenience,” he wrote, “with what most closely accords 
with self-interest and personal well-being or promises best to avoid awkward 
effort or unwelcome dislocation of life.  We also find highly acceptable what 
contributes most to self-esteem.”  Economic and social behavior, Galbraith 
continued, “are complex, and to comprehend their character is mentally tiring.  
Therefore we adhere, as though to a raft, to those ideas which represent our 
understanding.” 
So the conventional wisdom in Galbraith’s view must be simple, convenient, 
comfortable, and comforting—though not necessarily true.  It would be silly to 
argue that the conventional wisdom is never true.  But noticing where the 
conventional wisdom may be false—noticing, perhaps, the contrails of sloppy 
or self-interested thinking—is a nice place to start asking questions. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 16 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Oversight Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Kimberly A. Moore, Prof. of Law, 
George Mason University School of Law), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
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example, patent lawsuits in the United Kingdom are heard by 
specialized judges of the Patents Court or, for smaller claims, the 
Patent County Courts.17  In response to international outcry over its 
disregard for intellectual property rights, China recently 
established a new Judicial Court of Intellectual Property to handle 
IP cases on a nationwide basis.18  And to promote even greater 
international uniformity, there has been an ongoing call for a 
unified European Patent Court.19 
It is only natural that proposals for a specialized patent 
judiciary in the United States would follow,20 especially in light of 
the perceived high reversal rate.  But specialized patent trial judges 
are not the answer.  There is no reason to believe specialized trial 
judges would perform any better.21  Moreover, our initial 
assumption that trial court judges are reversed because they 
 
OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=470 (“No other country allows lay juries to decide patent 
cases.  In fact, many countries no longer have patent cases decided by generalist judges 
and have instead created specialized patent trial courts such as Germany, China, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Thailand, Korea and Turkey.”).  But see Erik Larson, Special IP Trial Courts a Bad Idea, 
Lawyers Say, IP LAW360, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.iplaw360.com/Secure/ 
ViewArticle.aspx?id=5183 (“Only six countries worldwide have developed specialized 
courts that exclusively hear intellectual property cases, a survey by the International Bar 
Association’s Intellectual Property and Entertainment Committee has found.”). 
 17 See Phillippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part I), 83 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 794 (2001) (“The judges who hear the patent cases are 
designated to hear all patent cases and thus become familiar with, if not specialized in, 
patent issues.  English juries are not available in patent cases, or in most other civil 
cases.”). 
 18 See Dean Visser, Update 2: China Creates Court for Piracy Cases, ASSOC. PRESS, 
Mar. 10, 2006. 
 19 See generally Seth Cannon, Note, Achieving the Benefits of a Centralized 
Community Patent System at Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415 (2003). 
 20 See, e.g., To Establish a Pilot Program in Certain United States District Courts to 
Encourage Enhancement of Expertise in Patent Cases Among District Judges, H.R. 5418, 
109th Cong. 1st Sess. (2006).  The call for specialized trial court judges has come amidst 
a flurry of patent reform efforts.  See generally William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the 
Patent Laws: Forging Legislation Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 9 (2006) (discussing recent patent reform legislation). 
 21 See Paul M. Schoenhard, Judging Trial Judges: Despite What Professor Kimberly 
Moore Told Congress in October, There Is No Need for Specialized Patent Judges, IP L. 
& BUS., Mar. 2006, at 22; Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: 
Oversight Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (summary of statement of 
Hon. T.S. Ellis, III), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ellis100605.pdf. 
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incorrectly construe patent claims ignores the possibilities: (1) that 
the Federal Circuit may erroneously construe patent claims and, as 
a result, reverse claim construction decisions that are otherwise 
correct; or (2) that the Federal Circuit may reverse district court 
claim constructions on the basis of underlying factual findings 
about which reasonable people may reasonably disagree. 
If, instead of pointing fingers, we wish to instill greater 
certainty into patent cases and to lower the rate of reversal, we 
need to look to the law itself.22  Specifically, a comparison of the 
nature of claims and how claims are construed in both patent and 
real property law can help us understand that the consideration of 
underlying facts, such as intent, is (and need be) properly part of 
any claim construction analysis.  Recognition of these inquiries as 
factual rather than legal does not violate the vital public notice 
function of these property claims and would not require a 
substantial departure from current practice.  And deferential review 
of these findings of fact will then lead to a lower reversal rate on 
appeal. 
II. FINDING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT 
The obsolete doctrines of our laws are frequently the 
foundation upon which what remains is erected; and it is 
impracticable to comprehend many rules of the modern 
 
 22 As then-Chief Judge Mayer commented in his dissent to the Federal Circuit’s order 
for en banc rehearing in Phillips v. AWH Corp.: “[u]ntil the court is willing to reconsider 
its holdings in Markman . . . and Cybor . . . , that claim construction is a pure question of 
law subject to de novo review in this court, any attempt to refine the process is futile.” 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order for reh’g en banc) 
(Mayer, C.J., dissenting).  See also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 2006 
WL 3378475, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2006) (denying petition for rehearing) (Michel, 
C.J., dissenting) (“In my view, four practical problems have emerged under the 
Markman-Cybor regime: (1) a steadily high reversal rate; (2) a lack of predictability 
about appellate outcomes, which may confound trial judges and discourage settlements; 
(3) loss of the comparative advantage often enjoyed by the district judges who heard or 
read all of the evidence and may have spent more time on the claim constructions than we 
ever could on appeal; and (4) inundation of our court with the minutia of construing 
numerous disputed claim terms (in multiple claims and patents) in nearly every patent 
case.”). 
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law, in a scholarlike scientific manner, without having 
recourse to the ancient.23 
A. Revisiting the Nature of Claims 
All forms of property are built on a framework of exclusive 
ownership rights.  Because disputes tend to arise at the boundaries 
of property, each piece of property must be defined by its 
boundaries,24 so-called “claims.”  Claims define the fundamental 
right of property—the right to exclude25—and provide notice of a 
property right to the public at large.  As a result, the legal 
construction of claims—the determination of the property owner’s 
boundaries—is the first step of any legal inquiry involving 
property, both in patent law and in the law of real property.26 
1. Patent Claims 
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that the claims of a 
patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the 
 
 23 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *44. 
 24 See, e.g., 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES 285 (3d ed. 
2003) (“Both for engineering and legal purposes, land is described by describing its 
boundaries.”). 
 25 For patents, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To Promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).  This enumerated power was used at 
one point to provide patent-holders also with a right to use.  See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 
11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 31821 (1793) (granting to a patentee “the full and exclusive right and 
liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used” the patented 
invention).  But now patent-holders are empowered solely with the right to exclude.  See 
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
For real property, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52 (2004) (“The foundational rights of property law 
are widely recognized to consist of the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and the right 
to use.  Among these rights, the right to exclude is considered the most important.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 26 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (“An infringement analysis entails two steps.  The first step is determining the 
meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.”), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 
(1995); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992); SIBIA 
Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The 
first step in any [patent] invalidity analysis is claim construction, . . . .”). 
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right to exclude.”27  Alternately put, “[a] claim is a group of words 
defining only the boundary of the patent monopoly.”28  As a result, 
modern patent law focuses on the claims of a patent. 
But claims were not always required by the United States 
Patent Laws.29  The word “claim” did not appear in patent 
terminology until Isaiah Jennings’ patent of November 20, 1807, 
which included the following paragraph: 
Such is my invention and I claim the benefit and 
application of it to every mode of forming thimbles by its 
instrumentality, whether the machine be worked by the foot 
of the operator upon a treadle, by his hand through a winch, 
by a wheel turned by hand labour, or by any mechanism set 
in motion by water, or by any other power.30 
Even this vague claim went above and beyond the 
requirements of the patent laws at that time. 
Before patent claims were required by statute, courts struggled 
to identify the boundaries of the property rights conveyed with 
patents.  For example, in 1821 Justice Washington confronted a 
patent in Isaacs v. Cooper31 which was “so manifestly defective” 
 
 27 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal 
quotations omitted).  See also Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“the claims perform the fundamental function of delineating the 
scope of the invention”) (citing Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 28 General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 29 The Patent Act of 1793 did not require claims but instead merely “a written 
description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the 
same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things 
before known . . . .” Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 32122 (1793).  See 
Homer J. Schneider, Claims to Fame, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 143, 144 
(1989) (“The Act of 1793 did not call for claims, nor for any examination beyond what 
you might call a mailroom review.”); Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. 
Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 134 (1938) (“Prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a 
claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that of the American states.”).  
But see 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.02 at 38 (2005) (“The courts read [the language of the 
Patent Act of 1793] as imposing a duty to include language equivalent to claims.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 30 Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 
135–36 (1938) (quoting 2 RESTORED PATENTS 161). 
 31 13 F. Cas. 153 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 7096). 
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that “the nature of the improvement is altogether unintelligible.”32 
Similarly, one year later in Evans v. Eaton,33 the Supreme Court 
held that the specification of a patent to Oliver Eaton did not 
adequately identify his invention.34  The Court explained that a 
patent’s specification is “for the purpose of warning an innocent 
purchaser, or other person using a machine, of his infringement of 
the patent; . . . .”35  The Court concluded that Mr. Eaton’s 
specification did not serve this purpose, and thus was not entitled 
to protection.36 
Accordingly, Congress sought to inject greater certainty into 
the boundaries of patent rights.  The Patent Act of 1836 required 
that a patent specification include a portion in which the inventor 
“shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or 
combination, which he claims as his own invention or 
discovery.”37  But even then, patent claims were used to 
distinguish a patented invention from the prior art38—findings of 
infringement were often based on a comparison of an accused 
device to the patentee’s actual product (not to the patent itself).39  
And it was not until the Patent Act of 1870 that claims, per se, 
were statutorily required.40 
 
 32 Id. at 154. 
 33 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
 34 Id. at 435 (“[I]f the plaintiff’s patent is to be considered as a patent for an 
improvement upon an existing Hopperboy, it is defective in not specifying that 
improvement . . . .”).  See also Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 (1818) 
(previous ruling in the same case, holding that an inventor must “show the extent of his 
improvements”). 
 35 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433–34.  See also Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 
437, 484 (1848) (“There are some further and laudable objects in having exactness to this 
extent, . . . . [S]o that the public, while the term continues, may be able to understand 
what the patent is, and refrain from its use, unless licensed.”). 
 36 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 435. 
 37 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. 
 38 See Lutz, supra note 30, at 140. 
 39 See id. at 147 (footnote omitted) (“During most of this period the claims rarely, if 
ever, received consideration on the question of infringement.  In spite of isolated 
statements that the claim is binding on the patentee when considering infringement, the 
latter question was almost universally treated as a question of fact to be decided by the 
jury from a comparison of the machines of plaintiff and defendant.”).  See also, e.g., 
Union Paper-Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120 (1877). 
 40 Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (July 8, 1870) (the applicant “shall 
particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which 
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In the following years, the Supreme Court clarified the 
“primary importance” of patent claims in cases such as Merrill v. 
Yeomans.41  In that decision, the Court noted: “It seems to us that 
nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the 
public, than that the former should understand, and correctly 
describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a 
patent.”42  This notion of fairness accompanying patent disclosure 
requirements has since been characterized as the “public notice 
function” of patent claims—“the role of the claims is to give public 
notice of the subject matter that is protected,”43 and 
correspondingly, “to apprise the public of what is still open to 
them.”44  To this end, the Supreme Court has commented that “[a 
patent] monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, 
its boundaries should be clear.  This clarity is essential to promote 
progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation.  A 
patent holder should know what he owns, and the public should 
know what he does not.”45 
 
he claims as his invention or discovery”).  See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 41 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876). 
 42 Id. at 573–74. 
 43 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle and Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 44 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). The public notice function of patent 
claims will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.C.2., infra. 
 45 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 
(2002).  See also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (“[The Federal Circuit] and the Supreme Court have frequently used the term 
‘public notice’ in connection with claims and discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, 
the point being that the public is entitled to notice of what the inventor has claimed and 
the Patent and Trademark Office has agreed should be the subject of a patent’s limited 
right to exclude.”). 
The written description of a patent also serves a public notice function, which is less 
relevant to the claim construction issues here.  Specifically, “[t]he written description 
requirement serves a teaching function, as a ‘quid pro quo’ in which the public is given 
‘meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for 
a limited period of time.’” Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 922 (quoting Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  This public notice function 
is directed toward the future ability of the public to practice the patented invention rather 
than the boundaries of the present right to exclude. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 
1120, 1122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (“the monopoly is granted upon the 
express condition, that the party shall make a full and explicit disclosure, so as to enable 
the public, at the expiration of his patent, to make and use the invention or improvement 
in as ample and beneficial a manner as the patentee himself.  If therefore it be so obscure, 
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These concepts have driven modern patent law.  Under 35 
U.S.C. § 2(a)(2), the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
“shall be responsible for disseminating to the public information 
with respect to patents and trademarks.”46  To accomplish this, the 
Director is authorized to publish patents, as well as the Official 
Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which 
identifies patents as they issue.47  Claims are now governed by, for 
example, the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires 
each patent to “conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.”48 
In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Court Improvements 
Act,49 which created and granted exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.50  The Federal Circuit was designed “to improve the 
administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent 
cases,”51 and in many ways it has fulfilled its mission.  But despite 
the uniformity offered by this specialized appeals court, the 
Federal Circuit continues to struggle to provide clear guidance on 
issues fundamental to patent claim construction.52 
 
loose, and imperfect, that this cannot be done, it is defrauding the public of all the 
consideration, upon which the monopoly is granted.” (emphasis added)). 
 46 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2000). 
 47 See id. §§ 10(a)(1), (3) (2000). 
 48 Id. § 112 para. 2 (2000). 
 49 Federal Court Improvement Acts, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant 
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 50 Id. at ch. 7, sec. 127(a), § 1295(a)(4)(A), 96 Stat. 25, 3738 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)).  Under the Act the Federal Circuit is composed of 
“[a]ll Federal judicial districts.” Id. at sec. 101, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)). 
 51 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12. 
 52 See, e.g., Gregory S. Maskel, Note, Product-by-Process Patent Claim Construction: 
Resolving the Federal Circuit’s Conflicting Precedent, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 115 (2006) (discussing one example of Federal Circuit claim 
construction jurisprudence that is in clear conflict). 
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2. Real Property Claims 
Like patent claims,53 real property claims define the boundaries 
of a property owner’s right to exclude.54  Real property claims, 
however, have enjoyed a longer and richer history.  As an extreme 
example, the following description was recorded in a deed in 
ancient Mesopotamia: 
Five gur of corn land, a gan, measured by the great cubit, 
being reckoned at thirty ka of seed, on the bank of the Bad-
Dar Canal, in Bit-Khambi; the upper length to the north, 
adjoining Bit-Khambi; the lower length to the south, 
adjoining Bit-Imbiati; the upper width to the west, 
adjoining Bit-Khambi; the lower width to the east, 
adjoining the bank of the Bar-Dar Canal.55 
Both in this ancient description and in modern claims, real 
property claims commonly “refer to the boundaries of adjoining 
land, as in ‘west 20 chains, more or less, to the land of Mary 
Jones.’”56  This practice is akin to the early tendency of patent 
claims to describe a patented invention in relation to the existing art.57 
 
 53 “The Supreme Court has likened patent claims to the description of real property in a 
deed ‘which sets the bounds to the grant which it contains.’” Gen. Foods Corp. v. 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbh, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917)). 
 54 See, e.g., 14 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 
§ 81A.05[1][b] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2006) (“[A deed’s property description] 
establishes the boundaries of the property.  It determines the area of land in or over which 
the owner possesses legally enforceable rights, privileges, powers and immunities.”). 
 55 WALTER G. ROBILLARD & LANE J. BOUMAN, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES 
§ 1.01, at 4 (7th ed. 1997) (quoting BABYLONIAN BOUNDARY STONES IN THE BRITISH 
MUSEUM xiii (L. King ed. 1912)).  See also 14 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 54, 
§ 81A.05[2][b][i] (“The oldest method of land descriptions in this country is the metes 
and bounds description.  Its usage goes back to colonial times.”). 
 56 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.2, at 820–
21 (3d ed. 2000) (“The adjoining land may be thought of as an artificial monument.”).  
See also 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 128, at 331–33 (3d 
ed. 2003) (discussing the description of property by reference to adjoining lands); Dean 
T. Lemley, Note, Due Care in Drafting Real Property Descriptions, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL 
L. REV. 324, 342 (1958) (“A deed may constitute a sufficient description of the land 
conveyed by stated that it is bounded by, or adjoins lands belonging to named persons.”). 
 57 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
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Although we have grown accustomed to thinking of real 
property in terms of recorded plats,58 “[t]he oldest method of 
describing land is by describing the lines that constitute its 
boundaries.”59  So-called “metes and bounds” descriptions can be 
highly complex and are susceptible to error.60  Stoebuck and 
Whitman explain the difficulties these descriptions raise: 
The earliest “metes and bounds” descriptions relied heavily 
on natural monuments.  In older deeds, references such as 
“beginning at the great white oak tree,” “along Mill Creek 
50 chains,” or the like were very common.  The lack of 
permanence of these monuments sometimes created severe 
problems for later buyers and their counsel; if the tree were 
removed or the creek changed course, it might be virtually 
impossible to locate the boundaries.  Artificial or manmade 
monuments, such as roads, bridges, fences, stakes, and 
posts are more widely used today, but are subject to the 
same objection to some degree.  Yet some use of 
monuments is essential, since present technology does not 
permit sufficiently precise location of points on the earth by 
means of astronomical measurement of latitude and 
longitude.61 
Like modern patent law, a firmly rooted notion in real property 
law is that “deeds, to be valid, must describe or otherwise identify 
the land affected.”62  Such descriptions, and corresponding 
 
 58 “The term ‘plat’ as employed technically refers to the drawing which represents the 
lines surveyed, established, retraced, or resurveyed.  It shows the direction and length of 
each of such lines, the relation to the adjoining official surveys, and the boundaries, 
description, and area of each parcel of land.” Carl E. Heck, Comment, Fixing Limits, and 
Surveying Land, 28 LA. L. REV. 625, 628 (1968) . 
 59 1 PALOMAR, supra note 56, § 127, at 321.  See also ROBILLARD & BOUMAN, supra 
note 55, § 4.04, at 10910 (“Metes and bounds are the most ancient form of description 
known to man.  Descriptions and monuments of land were recorded as early as 1000 
B.C., and some are recoverable today.”). 
 60 See ROBILLARD & BOUMAN, supra note 55, § 4.04, at 10910 (“As a general rule, most 
surveyors agree that metes and bounds surveys are difficult to retrace . . . . The metes and 
bounds survey system defies the orderly mind.”). 
 61 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.2, at 820 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 62 Id. at 819.  See also Dean T. Lemley, Note, Due Care in Drafting Real Property 
Descriptions, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 324, 324 (1958) (“[T]he legal description of 
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recording statutes, are designed to serve a public notice function 
similar to that served by a patent’s claims.63 
Real property claims are thus similar in many ways to patent 
claims, both in structure and in purpose.  As a result, real property 
law and its rich history can provide insights into a number of issues 
confronting patent law, including fundamental questions of patent 
claim construction, such as the distinction between law and fact. 
B. The Current Approach to the Law-Fact Distinction 
No two terms of legal science have rendered better service 
than “law” and “fact.” . . .  They readily accommodate 
themselves to any meaning we desire to give them . . . .  
What judge has not found refuge in them?  The man who 
could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy.64 
1. The Denial of Underlying Facts in Patent Claim 
Construction 
Now a decade old, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman I 
continues to control patent law and practice, but the court’s 
treatment of underlying facts during claim construction remains 
unclear.  In Markman I, the Federal Circuit held that “the 
interpretation and construction of patent claims, which define the 
scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law 
exclusively for the court.”65  Writing for the majority, Chief Judge 
Archer explained:  
“The reason that the courts construe patent claims as a 
matter of law and should not give such task to the jury as a 
factual matter is straightforward: It has long been and 
 
the deed must be sufficient to describe the real estate intended to be conveyed so that 
examination of the record title alone will disclose those elements of a description which 
will distinguish the land conveyed from all other land in the world.”). 
 63 Lemley, supra note 62, at 325 (“[S]ince the apparent purpose is the recording of the 
instrument, draft such a description as will preclude any confusion or misconception as to 
the identity of the real estate, from the public records alone.” (emphasis added)).  See 
supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text; see also Part III.C.2., infra. 
 64 LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930). 
 65 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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continues to be a fundamental principle of American law 
that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively 
with the court.’”66 
The Markman I decision then denied the existence of 
underlying factual inquiries beneath the legal conclusion.67 
But the law-fact distinction in patent claim construction and the 
precedential effect of the majority’s position was questionable.68  
Judge Rader, for example, noted in concurrence: “This court’s 
extensive examination of subsidiary fact issues is dicta.”69  On 
further appeal to the Supreme Court, a unanimous bench affirmed 
the Federal Circuit’s decision, but did not directly decide the issue 
of whether underlying facts may be considered in patent claim 
construction70 and recognized that claim construction “falls 
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact.”71 
Two years later, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,72 
the Federal Circuit sought to resolve two lines of cases that had 
diverged with respect to their treatment of underlying facts in 
patent claim construction.73  Denying that district court judges 
 
 66 Id. at 978 (internal citations omitted). 
 67 Id. at 981 (“Through this process of construing claims . . . and resolving disputes en 
route to pronouncing the meaning of claim language as a matter of law . . . , the court is 
not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary 
findings.” (emphasis in original)). 
 68 As will be discussed in greater detail below, Judges Mayer and Newman disagreed 
strongly with the court’s en banc treatment of subsidiary fact issues.  See id. at 989–98 
(Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 999–1026 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 998 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 70 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 384 n.10 
(1996) (“Because we conclude that our precedent supports classifying the question [of 
patent claim construction] as one for the court, we need not decide . . . the extent to which 
the Seventh Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction.”). 
 71 Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)); see also Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 443 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing Markman II as involving a mixed question of law and fact). 
 72 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 73 The court, once again sitting en banc, explained: 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman II, panels of this court have 
generally followed the review standard of Markman I. See Serrano v. Telular 
Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Alpex Computer 
Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1667 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
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were “making factual evidentiary findings” during patent claim 
construction,74 a majority of the court restated its earlier conclusion 
that claim construction is “a purely legal question.”75 
Only a handful of years later, the Federal Circuit decided to 
review this issue once again.  In its July 21, 2004 Order in Phillips 
v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit certified seven questions for 
appeal, including: 
(7)  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it 
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any 
aspect of trial court claim construction rulings?  If so, on 
what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent? 76 
When the Phillips decision arrived, however, the Federal Circuit 
majority noted only that “[a]fter consideration of the matter, we 
have decided not to address that issue at this time.”77  As a result, 
uncertainty as to the appropriateness of deferential review in the 
 
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996); General Am. Transp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 
39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (Fed Cir. 1996). In some cases, however, a clearly 
erroneous standard has been applied to findings considered to be factual in 
nature that are incident to the judge’s construction of patent claims. See 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555–56, 
42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1586, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1544, (Mayer, J., concurring); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 
F.3d 534, 539, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaullics Sys. Co. 
v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1798, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  We 
ordered that this case be decided in banc to resolve this conflict, and we conclude 
that the de novo standard of review as stated in Markman I remains good law. 
Id. at 1454–55 (footnote omitted). 
 74 Id. at 1454. 
 75 Id. at 1456 (“[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review 
claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions 
relating to claim construction.  Accordingly, we today disavow any language in previous 
opinions of this court that holds, purports to hold, states, or suggests anything to the 
contrary.”). Id. 
 76 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order for reh’g en banc). 
 77 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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law of patent claim construction persists.78  But guidance can be 
sought from the law of real property claim construction for which 
the treatment of the law-fact distinction and the resultant issue of 
deferential review are well-settled. 
2. The Role of Underlying Facts in Real Property Claim 
Construction 
As in patent law, courts have held consistently that real 
property claim construction is ultimately a question of law.79  But 
unlike the Federal Circuit majority’s view of patent law, real 
property law recognizes the role of intent and other subsidiary 
factual inquiries in claim construction.80  Specifically, a factual 
inquiry may be necessary to resolve an ambiguity,81 related either 
 
78 Recently, in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 2006 WL 3378475 (Fed. 
Cir. Nov. 22, 2006) (denying petition for rehearing), seven Federal Circuit judges 
recommended reconsideration of the court’s no-deference position. Id. at *2 (Michel, 
C.J., dissenting), *4 (Newman, J., dissenting), *6 (Rader, J., dissenting), *7 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring) (joined by Judges Linn and Dyk), and *7 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 79 See, e.g., McGeechan v. Sherwood, 760 A.2d 1068 (Me. 2000); Conner v. Hendrix, 
72 S.E.2d 259, 264 (Va. 1952) (“In the construction of deeds it is to be remembered that 
it is the duty of the court to give the proper meaning to every word used in the 
instrument, if possible.” (internal quotations omitted)); Baker v. Moorefield, 571 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“In a petition to establish boundaries, where the location 
of the boundary line is admitted, or evidence is not conflicting, the location of the line is 
a question of law for the court.” (internal quotations and ellipses omitted)); Currie v. 
Walkinshaw, 746 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (“[W]here a written instrument 
is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation is a matter of law.”).  But see Okemo Mtn., 
Inc. v. Lysobey, 883 A.2d 757, 760 (Vt. 2005) (“The location of a boundary line is a 
question of fact, to be determined on the evidence.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Arab Corp. v. Bruce, 142 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1944) (“[T]he main, the 
primary, purpose of construction [is] to arrive at the intent of the grantor as the deed 
expresses it”); Chesapeake Corp. of Va. v. McCreery, 216 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1975) 
(“The main task of a court in construing a deed is to ascertain the true intention of the 
grantor as drawn from the entire instrument.” (citations omitted)); Groeneveld v. Camano 
Blue Point Oyster Co., 81 P.2d 826, 829 (Wash. 1938).  The interpretation of intent is a 
question of fact. See 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 193 (2006). 
 81 See, e.g., Baker, 571 S.E.2d at 682 (“[W]here the language is ambiguous so that the 
effect of the instrument must be determined by resort to extrinsic evidence . . . the 
question of the parties’ intention becomes one of fact.” (emphasis and ellipses in original) 
(citations omitted)); Currie, 746 P.2d 1045, 1048 (“But where an instrument is 
ambiguous, interpretation of that instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact. . . . If 
an instrument is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, it is ambiguous, and its 
construction is a question of fact.” (citations omitted)). 
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directly to the intent of the parties to a deed or other land grant or 
to an historical or otherwise debatable fact.82 
Consider Reed v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals on 
Merrimac River.83  In 1850 the Supreme Court was asked to settle 
a boundary dispute arising out of the division of a large tract of 
land by a mortgage some sixty-eight years earlier.  This case 
required the trial court to construe, in particular, the northern 
boundary of the disputed land.  The language of the conveyance, 
however, did not fully resolve this dispute, and the court accepted 
evidence to clarify the location of the boundary.84  The court then 
instructed the jury: 
That if the jury believed from the evidence, looking to the 
monuments, length of lines, and quantities, actual 
occupation, &c., that it was more probable that the parties 
to the mortgage of 1782 intended to include therein the 
demanded premises than otherwise, they should return their 
verdict for the tenants.85 
The instruction was objected to on the grounds “that it submits the 
construction of the deed to the jury.”86 
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Grier began: “It is true, 
that it was the duty of the court to give a construction to the deed 
 
 82 See 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 247 (2006) (“[In the construction of the language used 
in a deed for the purpose of ascertaining the land conveyed, the intention of the parties, 
especially that of the grantor, as deduced from the whole instrument and the surrounding 
circumstances and conditions is controlling, just as it is in determining any other question 
arising in the construction of the deed.”); 14 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 54, 
§ 81A.05[3][a] (“The intent of the parties is the polestar for interpreting a deed . . . .”); 
Currie, 746 P.2d at 1048 (“In construing a deed the court should seek and, if possible, 
give effect to the intention of the parties.”) (quoting Gardner v. Fliegel, 450 P.2d 990, 
993 (Idaho 1969)).  Intent is every bit as much a factual issue in the construction of 
government land grants as it is in the construction of private land grants.  For example, 
the issue of intent was addressed by Justice White in Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 
707 (1973): “[O]ur task is to ascertain congressional will when it admitted Louisiana into 
the Union on April 8, 1812, and established her relevant western boundary as ‘beginning 
at the mouth of the river Sabine; thence, by a line to be drawn along the middle of said river, 
including all islands to the thirty-second degree of latitude . . . .’” (citations omitted). 
 83 49 U.S. (8 How.) 274 (1850). 
 84 The evidence considered by the court is discussed in Part III.C.2., infra. 
 85 Reed, 49 U.S. at 288. 
 86 Id. 
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in question, so far as the intention of the parties could be elicited 
therefrom . . . .”87  Claim construction is, after all, a matter of law.  
This, however, is not the end of the discussion. 
Justice Grier continued: 
But after all this is done, it is still a question of fact to be 
discovered from evidence dehors the deed, whether the 
lines, monuments, and boundaries called for include the 
premises in controversy or not.  A deed may be vague, 
ambiguous, and uncertain in its description of boundary; 
and even when it carefully sets forth the lines and 
monuments, disputes often occur as to where those lines 
and monuments are situated on the ground; and it 
necessarily becomes a fact for the jury to decide, whether 
the land in controversy is included therein, or, in other 
words, was intended by the parties so to be.88 
Beyond explicit inquiries into intent, real property claim 
construction also involves inquiries into historic or otherwise 
debatable facts.  For example, in County of Chenango v. County of 
Broome, the court was asked to locate the claimed boundary 
between two counties, and specifically the endpoint of that 
boundary at “the confluence of the Tioughnioga and Chenango 
rivers . . . .”89  This exercise required a factual inquiry into “the 
location of the original confluence of the two rivers that form one 
of the endpoints of the boundary line in question[;]”90 the case was 
remitted to a lower court for such a factual determination.  As 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 288–89 (emphasis in original). The role of intent as a factual inquiry in real 
property claim construction has also been recognized by the Federal Circuit.  For 
example, in Markman I Judge Archer acknowledged that: 
A question of fact may also arise in construing . . . deeds . . . when there is an 
ambiguous term.  In this situation, the parol evidence rule does not apply and 
extrinsic evidence may be offered to demonstrate what the parties intended 
when they used the term.  Thus the factual inquiry for the jury in these cases 
focuses on the subjective intent of the parties when they entered into the 
agreement. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc). 
 89 County of Chenango v. County of Broome, 180 A.D.2d 319, 321–22 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1992). 
 90 Id. at 322. 
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another example, consider again Reed v. Proprietors of Locks & 
Canals, in which the Supreme Court accepted witness testimony to 
establish “the existence in former times of another ‘bridle 
road . . . .’”91  In each of these cases, as with the above inquiries 
into intent, the resolution of factual issues was crucial to the 
ultimate legal conclusion. 
This leads us into a conflict.  As a 1943 First Circuit decision 
stated: “It appears to be firmly established that . . . a patent is 
subject to the same general rules of construction as any other 
written instrument.”92  And as Judge Archer similarly stated on 
behalf of the Federal Circuit majority in Markman I: “[t]he patent 
is a fully integrated written instrument.”93 But if patents are to be 
treated in a manner similar to real property, how is it that we 
account for underlying facts in real property claim construction but 
not in patent claim construction? 
C. Rethinking the Current Approach to the Law-Fact Distinction 
In his Markman concurrence, Judge Mayer explained: 
The ultimate issue of patent scope, depending as it does on 
the legal effect of the words of the claims, is a question of 
law.  But it does not necessarily follow that the judge is to 
decide every question that arises during the course of claim 
construction as a matter of law.94 
Judge Mayer then proceeded to offer a roadmap we can follow to 
reconsider the law-fact distinction in patent claim construction 
with the benefit of our experiences in real property.  Specifically, 
we must consider: “[1] whether fact issues may arise subsidiary to 
the ultimate legal conclusion, [2] how such issues are to be 
decided, and [3] by whom.”95 
 
 91 49 U.S at 289. 
 92 Doble Eng’g Co. v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 134 F.2d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1943). 
 93 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 978. (“The reason that the courts construe patent claims as a 
matter of law and should not give such task to the jury as a factual matter is 
straightforward: It has long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of 
American law that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court.’”) 
(quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)). 
 94 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. 
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1. Whether Fact Issues May Arise Subsidiary to the Ultimate 
Legal Conclusion 
The law-fact distinction in patent claim construction is 
generally approached as a matter of institutional competence,96 
with a majority sharing the view that judges are better suited than 
juries to resolve such issues.97  As a result, the question addressed 
in patent law is typically not whether underlying fact issues do 
arise, but rather whether they should.  This is the wrong question.  
Although the Federal Circuit majority may wish otherwise, 
underlying facts—and intent in particular—have been and 
regularly are considered in the process of construing patent claims. 
As in real property law,98 the interpretation of patent claim 
terms is ultimately a question of how those terms were intended to 
be used by the parties to the property grant—the patentee and the 
PTO.99  The Federal Circuit has explicitly recognized this role of 
intent in, for example, Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Società Per 
Azioni100: “Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can 
only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of 
what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with 
the claim.”101 
 
 96 See Signore, supra note 17, at 798 (“a question of fact is any question that can be 
answered by a jury, and a question of law is any question that can be answered by a 
judge”); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. 
L. REV. 1867, 1867–68 (1966) (“The categories of “questions of law” and “questions of 
fact” have been the traditional touchstones by which courts have purported to allocate 
decision-making between judge and jury. . . . [I]n many cases, Coke’s maxim has become 
a tautology: A question of law or a question of fact is a mere synonym for a judge 
question or a jury question.”). 
 97 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1995) 
(“judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms”).  
The question “who should decide?” is reserved for Part III.C.3, infra. 
 98 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 99 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
(“Like the specification, the prosecution history [of a patent] provides evidence of how 
the PTO and the inventor understood the patent. . . . [T]he prosecution history can often 
inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood 
the invention . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 100 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 101 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Società Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
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Additionally, like the construction of a deed or other land 
grant, “[patent] claim interpretation may require the factfinder to 
resolve certain factual issues such as what occurred during the 
prosecution history.”102  For example, in Silsby v. Foote,103 the 
Supreme Court, inter alia, approved of a lower court’s decision to 
treat the identification of components of a claimed combination for 
“‘a new and useful improvement in regulating the draft of 
stoves’”104 as an underlying fact issue.  The trial judge instructed 
the jury “that the third claim in the specification was for a 
combination of such parts of the described mechanism as were 
necessary to regulate the heat of the stove; . . . and he left it to the 
jury to find what those parts were . . . .”105 
Writing for the Court, Justice Curtis explained that “[t]he 
construction of the claim was undoubtedly for the court.”106  The 
Court proceeded to acknowledge: 
The writing which the Judge was to construe, calls for all 
such elements of the combination as are actually employed 
to effect the regulation of the heat, according to the plan of 
the patentee, described in the specification, and it therefore 
became a question for the jury, upon the evidence of 
experts, or an inspection by them of the machines, or upon 
both, what parts described did in point of fact enter into, 
and constitute an essential part of this combination.107 
The trial judge’s decision to treat the identification of the elements 
of the claimed combination as an inquiry into underlying fact 
seemed perfectly natural to the Court.  After all, “[h]ow could the 
 
 102 Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“In 
this case, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could find that the examiner 
rejected the claim as Arachnid construes it.”) (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  Note that the Arachnid 
opinion, which acknowledges the existence of underlying facts in claim construction, was 
penned by Judge Archer (the author of the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion in 
Markman I). 
 103 55 U.S. (14 How.) 218 (1852). 
 104 Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 219 (1852) (quoting the language of the patent). 
 105 Id. at 225. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 226. 
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Judge know this as a matter of law?”108  But this is precisely the 
point.  In certain circumstances there are issues of fact underlying 
patent claim construction that simply are not within the ambit of 
the court as a matter of law.109 
Silsby is not an anomaly.  Patent claim construction has been 
categorized as “a mixed question of law and fact” by numerous 
Federal Circuit panels110 and, at the Supreme Court, by at least 
Justice Stevens.111  This position was explained by Judge Newman, 
writing in dissent in Markman I: 
The legal construction of documents—patent documents 
and other documents—is indeed a matter of law.  The legal 
effect of the patent claim is to establish the metes and 
bounds of the patent right to exclude; this is a matter of 
law.  But this does not deprive the underlying facts of their 
nature as fact. . . . In patent infringement litigation there is 
often a factual dispute as to the meaning and scope of the 
technical terms or words of art as they are used in the 
particular patented invention.  When such dispute arises its 
resolution is not a ruling of law, but a finding of fact.112 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit majority is reluctant to admit 
explicitly that factual issues arise during claim construction.  In the 
Federal Circuit majority’s view, underlying fact issues should not 
arise during patent claim construction, lest the public notice 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to admit that a portion of claim construction 
was properly a jury issue: “not the construction of the claim, strictly speaking, but the 
application of the claim should be left to the jury.” Id. at 226.  But certainly a decision 
regarding the elements that constitute a claimed combination is a determination of that 
claim’s scope—claim construction. 
 110 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (identifying numerous Federal Circuit panel decisions that explicitly considered 
underlying questions of fact during claim construction).  See, e.g., Metaullics Sys. Co. v. 
Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (overruled in relevant part by Cybor, 138 
F.3d at 1456); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 
F.2d 1546, 1550–52 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
 111 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 443 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman II). 
 112 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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function of the patent’s claims be ill-served.113  In theory, because 
factual inquiries require the weighing of evidence, such inquiries 
during the claim construction process may result in uncertainty. 
But simply denying the existence of underlying facts does not 
strip them of their factual nature.  Arguments founded solely on 
concerns over the public notice function of claims overemphasize 
the value of the public notice function.114  Moreover, explicit 
 
 113 The Federal Circuit has also cited the need for uniformity in claim construction as a 
concern related to the recognition of underlying factual issues. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 
(“uniformity to the construction of a patent claim . . . would be impeded if [the court] 
were bound to give deference to a trial judge’s asserted factual determinations incident to 
claim construction.”).  But this concern is ill-founded.  As the ABA explained in its 
amicus brief in Phillips v. AWH Corp., “affording deference to underlying [factual] 
findings by a trial court would not impede uniformity.  Ultimately, the issue is one of 
law.  Thus, there is little risk of inconsistent claim construction rulings on the same term 
in the same patent, as an earlier claim construction determination by [the Federal Circuit] 
will be binding in future litigation under principles of stare decisis, and in some 
instances, issue preclusion.” Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party at 20–21, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc). 
 114 The public notice function of property claims is seldom fully realized.  For example, 
both patent and real property claims may be construed so as to preserve their validity.  
See, e.g., Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“claims should be 
so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”) (quoting Carman Indus., Inc. v. 
Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore 
Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (patent claims should be construed where 
possible to preserve their validity); Turrill v. Mich. So. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. 491, 510 (1864) 
(“[Patent claims] are to receive a liberal construction, and under the fair application of the 
rule, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, are, if practicable, to be so interpreted as to uphold 
and not to destroy the right of the inventor.”); 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 199 at p. 207 
(2005) (“Practically all courts agree that a deed will be given an interpretation which will 
cause it to be effective in preference to one which would render it inoperative, if not 
unreasonable or legally impossible.”).  Construction so as to preserve validity may 
require reference to non-public documents, such as unrecorded deeds in the real property 
context and “secret prior art,” such as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e) and (g), in the 
patent context.  As a result, the preservation of validity during claim construction may be 
violative of the claims’ public notice function.  Similarly, the expansion of patent claim 
scope under the doctrine of equivalents runs contrary to the public notice function of 
patent claims.  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 
(1997) (“There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, 
conflicts with the definitional and public notice functions of the statutory claiming 
requirement.”).  Although there is no perfect analog for the doctrine of equivalents in real 
property law, the effects of accretion and reliction on the water boundaries of real 
property are similar to the expansion of patent claim scope by equivalence to account for 
after-developed technologies.  See, e.g., 14 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 54, 
§ 81A.05[3][i][iii] (2006) (“A boundary which is marked by a stream or river will move 
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recognition of underlying facts in claim construction coupled with 
a principled approach to factual inquiries adequately protects the 
public notice function of claims. 
2. How Such Issues Are to Be Decided115 
Over centuries of real property law practice, safeguards have 
been developed so that factual inquiries may be made during the 
claim construction process without running afoul of the public 
notice function of claims.  Although the existence of underlying 
facts has not been recognized explicitly in patent claim 
construction, analogous rules have been developed in patent law 
practice.  It follows then that factual inquiries may be made during 
patent claim construction, if these rules are adhered to. 
With respect to intent, the public notice function of claims is 
best served by limiting the factual inquiry to the intent of the 
parties as expressed in the property grant itself.  In real property 
law, this rule has been stated: “It is not the intention that the parties 
may have had but failed to express in the instrument, but it is the 
intention that is expressed by the instrument.”116  Similarly, in 
 
with the thread of the stream or river if the change in location is due to gradual 
accretion.”); Monument Farms, Inc. v. Daggett, 520 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Neb. 1994) 
(“Accretion is the process of gradual and imperceptible addition of solid material, called 
alluvion, thus extending the shoreline out by deposits made by contiguous water; reliction 
is the gradual withdrawal of the water from the land by the lowering of its surface level 
from any cause.  Where the thread of the main channel of a river is the boundary line 
between two estates and it changes by the slow and natural processes of accretion and 
reliction, the boundary follows the channel.”) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, to 
consider a more anomalous situation, public notice of some patent rights was rendered 
nearly impossible for a period of time following a fire at the Patent Office in 1836.  See 
generally Bianca M. Federico, The Patent Office Fire of 1836, 19 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 804 
(1937).  The public notice implication of the Patent Office fire was addressed briefly by 
the Supreme Court in Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 485 (1848) (“The 
destruction by fire was no fault of the inventor; and his rights had all become previously 
perfected.”). 
 115 The Author here only addresses the primary safeguards to the public notice function 
of claims in the context of factual inquiries.  More detailed evidentiary issues, such as the 
appropriate uses of expert testimony during claim construction, while relevant, are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 116 Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. App. 1987).  See also Lemley, supra 
note 62, at 343 (“Identity of land is the sole purpose of the description, and the authorities 
are endless that nothing will pass by a deed except what is described in it, whatever the 
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patent law, “the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the 
specification, is regarded as dispositive.”117 
To ensure that inquiries into intent are limited in this manner 
during real property claim construction, “[s]elf-serving testimony 
regarding unexpressed subjective intentions of the grantor cannot 
be considered, but other evidence bearing on the intent of the 
parties may be received.”118  To do otherwise would violate the 
public notice function of the property claim and create an 
opportunity for the parties to engage in revisionist history.119  
Again, similar statements may be found in patent law—
“[inventor’s] after-the-fact testimony is of little weight compared 
to the clear import of the patent disclosure itself.”120 
Absent self-serving party testimony, courts may only look to 
the document itself and surrounding circumstances to determine 
the parties’ intent as a matter of fact.  To do this during both real 
property and patent claim construction, courts attempt to step into 
the parties’ shoes by developing fictional actors—in patent law, the 
person of ordinary skill in the art.121  Courts in both areas of law 
 
intentions of the parties may have been.” (citing inter alia Thayer v. Finton, 15 N.E. 615 
(N.Y. 1888))). 
 117 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (emphasis 
added).  See also Intellical, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (“where a disputed term would be understood to have its ordinary meaning by one 
of skill in the art from the patent and its history, extrinsic evidence that the inventor may 
have subjectively intended a different meaning does not preclude summary judgment.”). 
 118 W.S. Newell, Inc. v. Randall, 373 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Ala. 1979).  See also Joseph v. 
Duran, 436 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“the trial court correctly ruled that 
the parole evidence rule precluded appellants from introducing evidence concerning [the 
grantor’s] intentions when he conveyed lots 19 through 23 to [the grantees].”). 
 119 See, e.g., 14 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 54, § 81A.05[3][e] (2006) (“If 
subsequent, self-serving statements were permissible, then the grantor might be able to 
negate a previously effective conveyance by such tactics.”). 
 120 N. Am. Vaccine v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  See also 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 991 n.3 (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (“Of course, the inventor’s testimony as to what he intended or how he 
understands the patent, as opposed to his testimony as an expert, may be relevant, but is 
entitled to little weight in the face of evidence to the contrary.”). 
 121 See, e.g., Markman I, 52 F.3d at 986 (“Thus the focus in construing disputed terms in 
claim language is not the subjective intent of the parties to the patent contract when they 
used a particular term.  Rather the focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”); 
Key Pharm. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Dr. Guy testified 
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then consider how the terms used in the document would be 
understood by this fictional actor, either according to the terms’ 
customary meaning or by a special meaning known to experts in 
the area.122 
For example, in 1881 the Supreme Court of Iowa issued its 
opinion in Dunlieth & Dubuque Bridge Co. v. County of 
Dubuque,123 clarifying the Eastern boundary of the State of Iowa 
for taxation purposes.  In that case, the court construed the 
language “middle of the main channel,” as used in “[t]he act of 
congress of March 3, 1845, admitting Iowa into the Union, and the 
constitution of the state in its preamble, [which] declare that the 
eastern boundary of the state shall be ‘the middle of the main 
channel of the Mississippi river.’”124 
The court explicitly considered both the “primary meaning” 
and the “familiar meaning” of the term.  Specifically, the court 
found that, according to their primary meaning, the words in 
question “describe the bed in which the stream of the river flows.”125 
But, like many other words of our language which are 
controlled in their signification by the subjects under 
discussion when they are used, the word “channel,” when 
employed in treating of subjects connected with the 
 
that the patent provides no numerical values for the term, that one of ordinary skill in the 
art would therefore look to the FDA for numerical ranges, and that there one would find 
the range 2.5 to 15 mg of nitroglycerin per day . . . .”). 
 122 For real property law, see 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 254 (2005) (“Generally, in the 
absence of anything to the contrary indicated by the deed itself, words descriptive of the 
land conveyed are construed according to their proper and most generally known 
signification, rather than according to their technical sense, with the view of giving effect 
to the probable intention of the parties.”).  See also id. § 242 (“But according to the basic 
rule applied in construing deeds, that the dominant purpose is to ascertain and effectuate 
the intention of the parties, primarily that of the grantor, it follows that technical terms 
must be given their popular sense where the manifest intention of the grantor so 
requires.”); Lambert v. Pritchett, 284 S.W.2d 90, 90–91 (Ky. 1955) (“Terms are to be 
construed and understood according to their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless 
they have acquired a particular technical sense by the common usage of the trade.  They 
are to be construed with reference to their commercial and their scientific import.”). 
For patent law, see, for example, Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 
F.3d 985, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 123 See 8 N.W. 443 (Iowa 1881). 
 124 Id. at 446. 
 125 Id. 
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navigation of rivers, indicates the line of the deep water 
which vessels follow.  In this sense it is familiarly used by 
the boatmen of the Mississippi river.126 
Distinguishing between those conflicting definitions, the court 
reasoned: 
The course of navigation, which follows what boatmen call 
the channel, is extremely sinuous, and often changing, and 
is unknown except to experienced navigators.  On the other 
hand, the bed of the main river, designated by the word 
“channel,” used in its primary sense, is the great body of 
water flowing down the stream.  It is broad, and well 
defined by islands or the main shore.  It cannot be possible 
that congress and the people of the state, in describing its 
boundary, used the word “channel” to describe the sinuous, 
obscure, and changing line of navigation, rather than the 
broad and distinctly-defined bed of the main river.  The 
center of this river-bed channel may be readily determined, 
while the center of the navigable channel often could not be 
known with certainty.  The first is a fit boundary line of a 
state; the second cannot be.127 
Wrapped within this reasoning, a number of considerations come 
into play.  Specifically, the court considered both the intent of the 
drafters of the document, as manifested in the language they 
selected, and the public notice function served by that language.128 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id.  Once it settled on the primary meaning for the boundary of the State, the court 
turned to other reasons to support its conclusion.  These included the need to have non-
overlapping boundaries of Iowa and Illinois, whose boundary description did not use the 
word “channel;” and the language of the act of congress enabling the building of bridges, 
which “provides that the draw shall be constructed ‘over the main channel of the river, at 
an accessible navigable point.’” Id. at 447.  Similarly, in Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge 
Co., 17 N.E. 439 (Ill. 1888), the Supreme Court of Illinois preferred a similar 
construction for the Missouri-Illinois border and commented that “it would be a well-
known and easily-ascertainable boundary line.” Id. at 442. 
Justice White’s dissent in New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976), may also be 
instructive.  He wrote: 
No inquiry is made, however, by either the Court or the parties as to whether 
the ‘middle of the river’ has, or had, any commonly understood meaning in the 
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During these factual inquiries in both real property and patent 
claim construction, courts protect the public notice function of 
claims by limiting the use of extrinsic evidence.129  For example, 
as explained above, intent cannot be proven by self-serving party 
testimony.  Instead, as the Supreme Court of Virginia explained in 
Chesapeake Corp. of Virginia v. F.D. McCreery: “When the 
description in a deed is ambiguous and uncertain, extrinsic 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances and probable motives 
of the contracting parties at the time of the conveyance is 
admissible to show intent.”130  Or, as stated in patent law: “Only 
when the claim language is ambiguous may the court resort to 
extrinsic aids, such as testimony from experts in the field, to assist 
in the construction of claim language.”131 
 
law.  The Special Master concluded that these words, when used in 1740, 
intended to describe the geographic middle of the river—a line all points of 
which were equidistant from the nearest points on the shores. 
Id. at 371 (White, J., dissenting).  In this compact statement, Justice White addresses a 
number of issues.  First, Justice White implies that the term in question should be 
construed according to a “commonly understood meaning in the law.”  Second, such a 
meaning should be selected as would have been understood at the time the boundary was 
established.  And third, the purpose of the intellectual exercise is to establish the intended 
boundary at the time of the grant. 
 129 Over centuries of real property law practice, “courts ‘have laid down rules . . . 
founded on reason, experience and observation, which are rules pertaining, not to the 
admissibility.  But to the weight of evidence.’” 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND 
PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 151 (3d ed. 2003).  Similarly, in patent law, “[the Federal 
Circuit] has made strong cautionary statements on the proper use of extrinsic 
evidence, . . . which might be misread by some members of the bar as restricting a trial 
court’s ability to hear such evidence.  We intend no such thing.” Key Pharms. v. Hercon 
Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 130 216 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1975) (citations omitted).  See also Westmoreland v. Beutell, 
266 S.E.2d 260, 261 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (“Since the language in the deed is ambiguous, 
the trial court committed no error in admitting parol evidence to determine the intention 
of the grantor, as well as to determine the line by traditionary reputation.  This evidence 
did not contradict or vary the terms of the deed but was admissible to locate natural 
landmarks and to explain the ambiguity.”) (citations omitted); 14 POWELL & ROHAN, 
supra note 54, § 81A.05[3][e] (2006) (“If there is an ambiguity, then any extrinsic 
evidence which is introduced to clarify it must comply with the parol evidence rule.  This 
rule states that the extrinsic evidence may not contradict the written description, but 
rather may only explain or clarify it.”); 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Lands § 124 (2005) (“in 
the construction of a grant, parol evidence may be introduced as to the circumstances at 
the time the grant was made”). 
 131 Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 508, 520 (M.D. 
Pa. 2003).  See also Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1859) (holding 
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As a general matter, to perfect the public notice function of a 
property claim, the parties should “draft such a description as will 
preclude any confusion or misconception as to the identity of the 
real estate, from the public records alone[,]”132 and the admissible 
evidence should be so limited.  Similarly stated in the context of 
patent law, a trial court may resort to “those sources available to 
the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have 
understood disputed claim language to mean.”133 
But, when necessary, such extrinsic evidence may take the 
form of witness testimony,134 especially as to historic facts.  For 
example, considering again Reed v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals 
on Merrimac River,135 “the demandant, in order to show what land 
was intended by the parties to be included, produced witnesses to 
prove the existence in former times of another ‘bridle road,’ which 
he contended was the southern boundary of the mortgaged land, 
because a hundred acres lay north of this road, and the land was 
described as intersected by ‘one county bridle-road,’ which ran 
through the northerly part of the farm.”136 
 
that, where the construction of a claim term is clear from the patent’s specification, “it 
would be wholly superfluous to examine experts to teach the court, what they could 
clearly perceive without such information, . . . .”). 
 132 Lemley, supra note 62, at 325 (emphasis added). 
 133 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  Such sources include dictionaries.  See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz 
Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The parties direct us to Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary . . . .”); Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  See also Ehab M. Samuel, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Inc.: A 
Baffling Claim Construction Methodology, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 519, 549–52 (2006) (arguing that in certain instances it is preferable to consult 
extrinsic evidence). 
 134 See, e.g., Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“Unfortunately, on the record before us, we are unable to say with certainty 
whether or not one of skill in the art would understand that a power supply is designed to 
provide a constant voltage to a circuit.  Given the complex technology involved in this 
case, we think that this matter can only be resolved by further evidentiary hearings, 
including expert testimony, before the district court.”); Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. 
Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] trial court is quite correct in hearing and 
relying on expert testimony on an ultimate claim construction question in cases in which 
the intrinsic evidence . . . does not answer the question.”). 
 135 See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 136 49 U.S. (8 How.) 274, 289 (1850). 
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This process, as it is implemented in patent law, has been 
described by Judge Newman as follows: 
[F]acts are found on evidence that includes the patent 
specification, relevant prior art, the prosecution history, the 
testimony of experts in the field, and other relevant 
evidence such as tests and demonstrations . . . . These 
findings do not become rules of law because they relate to a 
document whose legal effect follows from the found facts.”137 
But the Federal Circuit has cautioned that “undue reliance on 
extrinsic evidence poses the risk that it will be used to change the 
meaning of claims in derogation of the ‘indisputable public records 
consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution 
history,’ thereby undermining the public notice function of 
patents.”138  This note of caution, however, suggests only the need 
for judges to mind their roles as evidentiary gatekeepers during the 
process of making factual inquiries, so as to protect the public 
notice function of claims. 
3. By Whom 
The only question that remains is: by whom should issues of 
underlying fact be decided?  At first blush this appears to be an 
easy question to answer.  Underlying questions of fact in real 
property claim construction are left to the fact-finder—typically a 
jury.  Similarly in patent law, the Federal Circuit has stated: 
“Litigants have the right to have a case tried in a manner which 
ensures that factual questions are determined by a jury and the 
decisions on legal issues are made by the court . . . .”139  But even 
this rule has its exceptions.  For example, the enablement 
requirement “is deemed to be a question of law, [but] it is 
 
 137 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 138 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting 
Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 139 Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 713 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).  See also Signore, supra note 17, at 797 (“The general rule that defines the jury’s 
role in patent cases and other civil cases in general is that the jury resolves questions of 
fact, while the judge resolves the questions of law.”). 
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amenable to resolution by the jury.”140  Additionally, equitable 
issues, even when they involve underlying facts (such as 
materiality for inequitable conduct purposes), need not be 
submitted to a jury.141  And, addressing the existence of factual 
issues in prosecution history estoppel, the Federal Circuit has 
acknowledged that “the resolution of factual issues underlying a 
legal question may properly be decided by the court.”142 
Historically, there have been numerous cases in which 
questions of patent claim interpretation were submitted to juries for 
factual findings.  For example, in Silsby v. Foote,143 the Supreme 
Court, inter alia, approved of a lower court’s decision to leave 
underlying questions of fact relevant to the construction of a claim 
to a patented combination to the jury.144 
The shift from jury to judge in patent claim construction was 
described in a 1938 article as follows: “As time went on complete 
control of the interpretation of patent documents was gradually 
transferred to the judge.  When it became apparent that the jury 
was not equal to the task, the custom developed of having the 
judge include in his charge to the jury a detailed interpretation of 
the patent coupled with instructions that his interpretation was 
binding on the jury.”145  This development is consistent with what 
has been dubbed a “complexity exception” to the Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury: “If a particular lawsuit is so 
complex that a jury cannot satisfy this requirement of due process 
but is nonetheless an action at law, we face a conflict between the 
 
 140 Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  See 
also Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“Although enablement is ultimately a question of law, this court has recognized that 
there may be underlying factual issues involved.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 954 (1987). 
 141 See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (en banc); Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samik Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 
1408 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[I]ssues of fact underlying the issue of inequitable conduct are 
not jury questions, the issue being entirely equitable in nature.”). 
 142 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368 
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 143 55 U.S. 218 (1852). 
 144 See supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text. 
 145 Lutz, supra note 30, at 143. 
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requirements of the fifth and seventh amendments.”146  “[W]e find 
the most reasonable accommodation between the requirements of 
the fifth and seventh amendments to be a denial of jury trial when 
a jury will not be able to perform its task of rational decision-
making with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the 
relevant legal standards.”147 
This “complexity exception” has been condemned by the 
Federal Circuit.  For example, offering additional views in SRI v. 
Matsushita Electronic Corp., Judge Markey wrote: 
We discern no authority and no compelling need to apply in 
patent infringement suits for damages a “complexity” 
exception denying litigants their constitutional right under 
the Seventh Amendment. (citation omitted) There is no 
peculiar cachet which removes ‘technical’ subject matter 
from the competency of a jury when competent counsel 
have carefully marshalled and presented the evidence of 
that subject matter and a competent judge has supplied 
carefully prepared instructions.148 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on this 
issue, stating simply that: “Because we conclude that our precedent 
supports classifying the question [of patent claim construction] as 
one for the court, we need not decide . . . the extent to which the 
Seventh Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact 
distinction.”149  But the ultimate decision of judge or jury will, for 
 
 146 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980), 
subsequent judgment aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 147 Japanese Elec. Prods., 631 F.2d at 1086.  But see In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 
609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (“Not only do we 
refuse to read a complexity exception into the Seventh Amendment, but we also express 
grave reservations about whether a meaningful test could be developed were we to find 
such an exception.”). 
 148 SRI v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey, J., 
additional views) (citations omitted). See also Markman I, 52 F.3d at 1000, 1010–17 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional right to a jury trial, as secured by 
the Seventh Amendment, may be violated when underlying facts are not submitted to a jury). 
 149 Markman II, 517 U.S. at 384 n.10.  See also Signore, supra note 17, at 800 (“In 
effect, the Markman Court undermined the role of juries in patent cases by taking away 
one of the key elements of a patent case away from juries based on a complexity 
argument.”). 
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purposes of this inquiry, have little impact on the reversal rate of 
claim construction decisions, so long as underlying factual 
determinations made by a judge as factfinder are properly 
recognized as factual.150 
III. DEFERENTIAL REVIEW AND A LOWER REVERSAL RATE 
Patent claim construction, like real property claim construction, 
involves questions of underlying facts, including intent.  Indeed, in 
both areas of property law, factual inquiries have been made 
during the claim construction process.  Even though explicit 
consideration of fact issues in the context of patent law has been 
denied, similar analytical processes have been developed in both 
areas of property law (independently, in many cases) to resolve 
these factual issues.  But these findings should be recognized for 
what they are—findings of fact.  Public notice concerns are 
unavailing, as the safeguards in place in both areas of law allow for 
principled factual inquiry, with the court acting in its role as 
evidentiary gatekeeper. 
As a result, although claim construction is ultimately a matter 
of law, reviewable de novo, conclusions with respect to these 
underlying facts would be appropriately reviewed by a deferential 
standard.151  Factual determinations made by a judge under the 
complexity theory will be reviewed for clear error,152 and those 
 
 150 See infra notes 153–154 and accompanying text.  But see Structural Rubber Prods. 
Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Findings of fact by the jury 
are more difficult to set aside (being reviewed only for reasonableness under the 
substantial evidence test) than those of a trial judge (to which the clearly erroneous rule 
applies).”). 
 151 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 2006 WL 3378475, at *2, *5 (Fed. Cir. 
Nov. 22, 2006) (denying petition for rehearing) (“[P]erhaps we should routinely give at 
least some deference to the trial court, given its greater knowledge of the facts.” (Michel, 
C.J., dissenting)) (“I urge this court to accord deference to the factual components of the 
lower court’s claim construction.” (Rader, J., dissenting)).  In other contexts it is well 
established that mixed questions of law and fact should be broken into their component 
parts, with each part reviewed under an appropriate standard. See, e.g., Richardson-Vicks 
Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the ultimate 
question of obviousness is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo, while the 
underlying factual determinations made by a jury are reviewed for substantial evidence). 
 152 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2005) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
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determinations made by a jury will be reviewed for substantial 
evidence.153 
The inevitable result of recognizing the existence of factual 
inquiries during claim construction and imposing an appropriate 
deferential standard on the reviewing court (here, the Federal 
 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.”); see Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam).  
Some states have adopted rules similar to Rule 52.  See, e.g., Okemo Mtn., Inc. v. 
Lysobey, 883 A.2d 757, 760 (Vt. 2005) (“We review findings of fact only for clear error.  
V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2).  Findings will be sustained on appeal unless, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is no credible evidence to support 
the findings.”).  Other state appeals courts in real property boundary disputes simply 
apply the common law ore tenus rule, whereby the trial judge’s findings are not disturbed 
unless they are clearly wrong or unjust. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 153 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).  Judge Mayer described the 
appropriate standard of review: 
When a question of claim construction arrives [at the Federal Circuit] on 
appeal, [that] court reviews the ultimate construction given the claims under the 
de novo standard applicable to all legal conclusions.  But any facts found in the 
course of interpreting the claims must be subject to the same standard by which 
[the Federal Circuit reviews] any other factual determinations: for clear error in 
facts found by a court; for substantial evidence to support a jury’s verdict. 
Id.  Not everyone agrees that technical issues of fact should be granted deference by the 
Federal Circuit.  Considering the appeal of bench-tried facts, Professor Dreyfuss argues: 
Despite the important interests served by Rule 52(a), it is clear that it operates 
perversely as regards the CAFC.  The Rule rests on the assumption that the trial 
court is in at least as good a position as, and often a better position than, the 
court of appeals for deciding factual issues.  When both appellate court and trial 
court are composed of generalists, this assumption is true. There is no reason to 
think that a judge appointed to a trial court is less capable than an appellate 
judge to review documentary evidence, and the district court has an immediate 
sense of testimonial evidence and is better situated to evaluate the credibility of 
the witnesses.  Where, however, the trial court is composed of generalists and 
the appellate court is staffed to deal with the complex factual issues being tried, 
the assumption breaks down, for the appellate court is at least as well situated 
to find the facts as the trial court.  A trial judge who has never read a technical 
document before is less likely to interpret it correctly, no matter how many 
expert witnesses are called to testify, than an appellate judge who has extensive 
experience in dealing with such matters.  Thus, it seems somewhat peculiar to 
allow a layman’s decision to stand on a technical issue such as the content of 
prior art, when the experienced judges of the CAFC, and the experts they 
employ, think that the finding is wrong, but not “clearly erroneous.” 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (1989). 
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Circuit) is the desired outcome—a lowered reversal rate for patent 
claim construction decisions.154  Moreover, such deference: 
[P]rotects the judgment winner from relitigation at the 
appellate level and promotes the efficient use of judicial 
resources by insuring that the court most qualified to find 
the facts has the final say.  In addition, [a deferential 
standard] prevents the appellate court from substituting its 
own judgment for that of the trial court, thereby 
safeguarding the integrity of the district court and 
promoting public respect for its decisions.155 
In the end, disregarding the role of underlying questions of fact 
in patent claim construction is farcical.156  As confirmed by the law 
of real property claim construction, patent claim construction 
involves inquiries into underlying facts and provides safeguards to 
protect the public notice function of claims during such inquiries.  
Deference to underlying findings of fact in patent claim 
construction is the appropriate answer.  And a more comfortable 
reversal rate will be the result. 
 
 154 See, e.g., Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 28 (“Greater deference to 
the meaning assigned to claim terms by the district court would increase the affirmance 
rate at the Federal Circuit.”); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 
(1985) (“[The clearly erroneous] standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to 
reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have 
decided the case differently. . . . If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible 
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even 
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 
evidence differently.  Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citations omitted)); 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (“In applying 
the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, 
appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual 
issues de novo.”).  In fact, even the choice between judge and jury, see supra 
Part III.C.3., should result in a difference in reversal rate. See supra note 151. 
 155 Dreyfuss, supra note 153, at 47.  See also Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 
14, at 28–29 (“[T]he increased affirmance rate would nonetheless raise confidence in the 
judicial system.  Greater deference would also discourage appeals and increase 
settlements earlier in the litigation process.  In addition, it may result in more thoughtful 
claim construction by district court judges.”). 
 156 In his Markman I concurrence, Judge Mayer commented: “Indeed, the effect of this 
case is to make of the judicial process a charade, for notwithstanding any trial level 
activity, this court will do pretty much what it wants under its de novo retrial.” Markman 
I, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
